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HOW WAS IT FOR YOU? THE OLIGARCHIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FEMINIST THEORY 
By Leonard A Stonei 
Abstract 
It is my purpose to show that radical humanist and feminist theorising have much to 
offer each other. Central to this article’s thesis is the oligarchic structure of international 
relations; that is, a small, oligarchic clique of states exercising power in its own interests 
to the detriment of the overwhelming majority of the world’s population. The core 
position and borders of radical humanist theorising are examined, along with an 
assessment of some of the major the theoretical divergences between radical humanist 
and feminist theorising. Areas for theoretical alliance are also located which indicate the 
necessity of an inter-disciplinary approach that takes into account Third World liberation 
and the Green movement. A review of world government literature is noted, along with a 
review of contemporary examples of mainstream International Relations publications - 
which continue to avoid the feminist standpoint, or relegate feminism to a subsidiary 
position – and the faulty theoretical positions of Anthony Giddens and the pro-polyarchy 
perspective. The conclusion considers the benefits of cross-theoretical dialogue between 
feminist theory and radical humanist theory.  
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Introduction 
You may find that you believe in the theory of feminism, but you do not see 
yourself fitting into the branches of feminism… You can believe that women 
and men should be politically, economically and socially equal for your own 
reasons and hold your own ideas pertaining how you can make that happen. If 
that is the case, then generally you can consider yourself a feminist” - 
Feminism Theories Defined.1 
 
“Humanism believes in a far-reaching program that stands for the 
establishment throughout the world of democracy, peace, and a high standard 
of living on the foundations of a flourishing economic order, both national and 
international” – Humanism Defined .2 
 
An emancipatory discourse on international politics, rather than a rationalising one, 
critically analyses the conservative stance of foundational International Relations (IR) 
theories such as realism (the politics of power) and international liberalism and in 
particular their lack of theoretical focus on the oligarchic structure of international 
relations. With regard to the global, anti-democratic nature of the prevailing system of 
international relations, emancipatory discourses such as feminism, Marxism and radical 
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humanism differ, for example, on the fundamental global strategy of how to replace the 
present (oligarchic) structure with a more democratic system; they differ over the 
fundamental democratic units that are to be set in place.   
The proclivity of the world system of politics to incline towards oligarchy rather than 
democracy remains of paramount importance in the radical humanist perspective. In 
practice this means that a clique of states – The West (Britain, France, and the USA) 
along with China and Russia – “lord it over”, politically, the other 180 or so nation-states 
(recognised by the United Nations (UN)) which make up the formal world system of 
states.  
However, realist texts strategically deploying the concepts of sovereignty (of the 
nation-state) and anarchy (epitomising the world system in which a world government is 
absent), on the contrary, argue from the point of view of the “inevitability” of the 
contemporary world system where a small grouping of states hold sway. Even a state’s 
external security is safeguarded by the anarchic nature of the world system of politics, as 
the realist argument runs, for it leaves the state with the liberty to defend its security 
either through its own resources or by becoming a member of a strategic alliance.3 This 
conservative and pro-status quo ideology of international relations runs counter to 
criticisms of the oligarchic structure of international relations which see a real potential 
for change; that is, for international democracy whereby all states and their populations 
are equal participants in a democratic world order. 
The one-world liberal humanist call for the democratisation and empowerment of the 
UN - as a first step to toward democratisation (an emancipatory goal ultimately aiming 
for a federal, democratic world government) - lacks emancipatory potential if the unjust 
international world economic order is left largely in place. Such an international 
economic order leaves, for instance, one billion people living on less than 1$ US a day: 
the cruel disposition of an international political and economic order functioning in the 
interests of a minority of powerful states. 
 A more radical humanist discourse critically examines the predatory global economic 
strategies of a small and closed oligarchy of a handful of militarily and economically 
powerful states and proposes a twin track remedy: democratisation of international 
relations at both the political and economic levels. 
However, the theoretical cut-and-thrust of the radical humanist perspective is 
positioned at the level of the political. Theoretically robust critiques of the international 
economic order on the other hand are located more in the field of radical 
(under)development studies. Radical humanism nevertheless calls for a global 
redistribution of wealth citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25, 
which states that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of individuals and their families, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services. 
Feminist theory in IR studies share some theoretical borders with the radical humanist 
position; particularly on the entrenched distribution of power that excludes women and 
the working class from the public sphere. This feminist standpoint has a theoretical 
pedigree that can be traced to early modern proto-feminist theorising evident, for 
instance, in the writings of Mary Astell and especially in writings opposing the classical 
liberal position of Locke and Milton.4 In other words the appeal of freedom from 
domination has been, and is both a feminist and radical humanist preoccupation. At other 
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sites and locations of analysis, however, theoretical incongruence is in evidence. A most 
glaring example here is radical humanism’s lack of attention to the gender system, which 
from the feminist standpoint always privileges the masculine over the feminine and 
which has the direct effect of enabling men always to occupy positions of social and 
political power (historically and cross-culturally) to the detriment of women. A broad 
theoretical dialogue between these two standpoints is thus required. The oligarchic 
structure of international relations forms an appropriate point of departure. 
 
Radical Humanism and the Oligarchic Structure of International Relations 
 
Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya typifies the radical humanist critique of the prevailing 
mode of international relations – i.e. a pro-democratic ideology of international relations.5 
Humanist credentials of a secular character permeate this perspective, particularly its 
optimistic emphasis, in the last analysis, that human beings possess the power to solve 
political problems through reliance primarily upon reason and political will. It also 
encapsulates humanism’s stress on freedom and progress (economic, political, cultural 
and ethical) of all humankind, irrespective of nation, ethnicity or religion. The use of 
democratic procedures including full freedom of expression and civil liberties throughout 
all areas of economic, political, and cultural life remains paramount in humanist 
discourse. Above all else, and most pertinent for this article, humanism believes in a far-
reaching socio-political programme for the establishment of democracy on a global scale 
and a flourishing, sustainable economic order. Occupying the central plateau of radical 
humanist theory is its broad critique of mainstream contemporary IR theory.  
The radicalism of this humanist standpoint, moreover, is positioned outside of liberal 
internationalism, which is critically viewed as being “blind” to imperialism and its own 
ethnocentrality. Occupying the commanding heights of the radical humanist position is 
the thesis that the contemporary international system is anti-democratic and oligarchic in 
structure, and has been so for the last two hundred years, since the Congress of Vienna in 
1815. Bandyopadhyaya argues, “A small and closed oligarchy of militarily and 
economically powerful states informally governs the vast majority of states through its 
predatory global strategies in the name of state sovereignty and international anarchy. But 
in spite of their advocacy of democracy for all states at the national level, the governing 
oligarchy of the international system strongly opposes any proposals for international 
democracy”.6   
In this view the prevailing international system of world politics is characterised by 
acute asymmetry  (unequal and exploitative relations between core states (oligarchy) and 
the periphery states (rest), and is in reality shot through with gross political and economic 
injustice. This world system is overseen by a hegemonic and predatory oligarchy. In 
short, the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (P5) function as a political 
oligarchy; along with an overlapping clique of states who control the world capitalist 
economy, the G7 (and not the now renamed G8 properly) grouping of developed states: 
Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. Russia, with an 
economy merely the size of Holland, made up the G8 grouping officially in June 2002 for 
strategic rather than economic reasons. 
Radical humanist theory positions itself opposite realism’s fundamental a priori –i.e. 
the international system as fundamentally anarchical. Radical humanists posit the thesis 
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that “the [realist] paradigm of international anarchy is only an ideological camouflage for 
the rationalisation, legitimisation and perpetuation of this undemocratic and grossly 
unjust international sysytem”.7 This idea of international anarchy, moreover, simply 
allows a form of justification for states to pursue selfish national interests to the detriment 
of  international interests and especially developing states. And it is the idea of the 
sovereign independent state pursuing its own interests, which continues to dominate 
world politics. 
Even non-state actors in international relations, including transnational corporations 
and nongovernmental organisations, for example, function across national frontiers only 
with the approval of the state, often as agents of the state. The UN itself, moreover, was 
conceived as a clearinghouse for the conflicting national interests of sovereign states, 
rather than a superstate global regulatory authority that would restrict state sovereignty in 
any manner. 
Recognising nonetheless that processes within the international system have become 
transnational and global during the last fifty years or so, the problematic of globalisation 
is skirted rather than defined in radical humanist theory. Despite this oversight the 
guiding thread of the radical humanist position, its principle aim, remains political 
equality. Political justice (emanating from global political equality) can be realised only 
when international organisations, and especially the UN, make qualitative progress in the 
direction of globally constraining powerful states. The UN furthermore would require 
major amendments to its Charter which has been rendered virtually impossible by the 
stubborn and adamantine opposition of the P5 states and their strategic allies. Opposition, 
that is, to giving greater chances to the states and populations outside of the P5 and “G7”. 
None of the P5 states has proposed the democratic transference of security functions, 
wholly or partly, from the Security Council to the General Assembly, (the 
democratisation of UN decision making), or indeed a wider democratic and regulatory 
role for the UN. Notwithstanding this critical point, it is only by major reform of the UN 
that, as David Held notes, “cosmopolitan democracy” (international democratic 
governance) can be established.8  
The radical humanist position occupies an ideological space shaped by emancipatory 
rhetoric. Significantly, and occupying the lowlands of radical humanist narrative are 
repeated conceptions of its own moral (political equality) and interventionist platform. 
Bandyopadhyaya again: “The virtually unlimited support extended to this oligarchic 
international system by those very states which proclaim democracy to be a universal 
principle of political organisation in human society is the most glaring paradox of 
international relations…The oligarchic international system brought into existence by the 
ruling classes of the militarily and economically powerful states does not, however, enjoy 
the support of all sections of world public opinion”.9 A problem for radical humanists is 
that their call for world government enjoys scant support from all sections of society.  
The point here, nevertheless, is not to box-in radical humanist calls for a world 
government, to simply pigeonhole them as idealists or utopians. For this confrontation is 
played out in competing paradigms elsewhere and needs no further comment here. It is, 
more to the point radical humanism’s pokerfaced political critique of what are essentially 
prevailing power interactions positioned, lopsided and in favour of the West and found at 
the confluence of core (politically and economically powerful states) – periphery (the rest 
of the world’s populations) relationships. This poignant perspective, theoretically lacking 
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complexity, still manages to (re)present an alternative radical theory. Its alternative, 
radical strength lies in its normative critique of the unfair “balance” in international 
relations, rather than its utopian call for world government (not to be confused with 
“world society”).  
The topography of radical humanist discourse is a shifting, fertile canvas and is 
marked by flexible theoretical borders. These borders are sharpened when it focuses on 
Third World liberation. The Marxist conception of the international class struggle can be 
and is theoretically extended and applied to the international struggle of the oppressed 
and exploited class of Third World states. However, as part of the struggle for political 
equality, radical humanism is less class-focussed than classical Marxism and is rather an 
inclusive political ideology centred basically on the liberation of the world’s 
marginalised, the majority who are women. This interventionist stance is what motors the 
radical humanist engine. But how does feminist theory sit with the conception of an 




Core feminist theorising in IR consists of a critique of male-centred thinking, an 
analysis of gender and an analysis of conditions for women in the world. Questions of 
identity, patriarchy and exclusion are central to the concerns of feminists. Feminist 
perspectives on international relations have provided a distinctive foci and agendas, in 
particular highlighting the extent to which masculinity has distorted conceptions of power 
and epistemology within the discipline. Moreover, and as Rebecca Grant notes, feminist 
theory has developed alongside IR theory since the end of the First World War and the 
successful movement for women’s suffrage in the UK and USA in particular.10 Particular 
aspects of feminist challenges to the authority of IR knowledge shed light on the 
construction of feminist theory. In terms of global scope both feminist and radical 
humanist theorising on IR paint a broad canvas. Wendy Brown expresses an instance of 
feminist theorising and the breadth of feminist thought by arguing that everything in the 
human world is a gendered construction.11  
Women’s political struggles against marginalisation and exclusion from status-quo 
public power impart a strong objectivity to knowing because women often have the most 
to gain from developing critical understanding (‘knowing from experience’) of exactly 
how the world which oppresses them is constructed, and how it might be reconstructed.12 
The political struggle for women’s equality has by implication become part of the 
Third World liberation struggle given that the overwhelming majority of the world’s 
marginalised women are found in these states. Working class women are at the core of 
these populations. Political unity of the world’s oppressed, furthermore, is a political 
prerequisite for a world democratic government. Women, gays and lesbians, the working 
class and other marginalised groups require political unity, and indeed the political will to 
engage in a progressive global agenda in order wrest political control from the 
international oligarchy. Development seen as a human right and post-colonial sustainable 
development unites feminists and world government perspectives in the Third World, but 
there is a further accommodation that encourages a shared space, a core platform of 
understanding, between the feminist and world government perspective. In recent years 
gender-sensitive research into international development in the context of the “North-
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South” divide demonstrated the importance of taking gender into account.13 This suits 
radical humanism’s traditional, (albeit theoretically underdeveloped) recognition of 
women as a global disadvantaged group, owning one percent of the world’s property and 
resources, while performing sixty percent of the labour and forming the majority of 
refugees, illiterate and poor persons. Both perspectives are supportive of collective 
activism, moreover, which creates alternative values that motivate broad community 
resistance and empowers people to take control over their everyday lives.14 Women’s 
regional networking is an essential element in this empowering project. However, 
differences remain, particularly with regard to gender-biased, critical non-feminist 
theories of world politics. 
Like mainstream IR theories, the discourse of radical humanism overlooks the private 
sphere of the family household because it is submerged within the “domestic analogy” 
itself.15 Notwithstanding this “blind side”, a major theoretical fissure remains between 
feminist and radical humanist theorising on world politics. 
From one feminist standpoint, the traditional generic units of analyses underpinning 
radical humanism’s analysis of world politics - nation-states in the context of an 
international system – are seen as gendered social constructions which take specifically 
masculine ways of being and knowing in the world as universal. A particular focus on the 
gendered agency of the state in IR exposes the patriarchal logic of the radical humanist 
approach, and in particular its conception of women’s agency which fails to recognise its 
diversity, which is absolutely essential to, but politically repressed in radical humanist 
discourse. Feminist standpoints on the state also generate a theoretical difference with 
radical humanism. Feminist theory in IR views sovereign relations with other states, as 
well as man’s relation to woman inside states, as defining the internal constitution of 
sovereign man and sovereign state. Masculinist domination is integral to and 
institutionalised within the state-system. Radical humanism has yet to seriously engage 
with these criticisms. 
And yet obvious points of congruence remain evident as both theories oppose 
foundational “givens” in the field of IR – anarchy and sovereignty – and both search for 
models of human agency emanating from marginalised positions including women, the 
colonised, and people of colour’s resistance. Unlike radical humanists, however, a 
number of feminist scholars of IR16 continue to analyse the “gender-specificity” of the 
constitutive (socially constructed) concepts (power, rationality, security and sovereignty) 
that underpin the levels of analysis in IR and in realist theory in particular. Radical 
humanists on the other hand remain locked in non-gender analyses of anti-democratic, 
core (rich) – periphery (poor) power configurations. 
Feminist theory opposes the gendered, oligarchic structure of international relations, 
and just as radical humanism uses key concepts such as “power” and “rationality” as 
building blocks of explanation for a theory of international relations, there is nothing 
inherent in the terms themselves which suggest, according to Ann Tickner, that feminist 
theory may not use them as building blocks.17 Both feminist theory and radical humanism 
IR theory simply reject their narrow and exclusionary meanings in mainstream IR theory 
and practice. But radical humanism’s radicalism ends abruptly here. With an 
underdetermined focus on women’s struggles and rights it belies a skewed theoretical 
stance. It needs to accommodate feminist theorising on gender systems, which is typically 
and surprisingly relegated to a sub-text within radical humanism’s grand narrative.  
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A poignant site of feminist theory, then, houses the critique of male-dominated 
scholarship in the field of IR, scholarship which in general does not include concrete 
subjectivity as a theoretical consideration, preferring instead abstract objectivity – a sexist 
academic trait. The stance of objectivity is exposed in feminist theorising as androcentric 
for claiming universal validity, when it is actually only congruent with elite male 
perspectives and masculine attributes.18  
A second, orthodox feminist point for the radical humanist to bear in mind is that the 
act of theorising is itself a conscious practice inescapably implicated with power. To 
exclude women from, or to treat them as a periphery concern for the grand project of 
abstract theory has profound implications, especially for liberal ideology. Liberals, along 
with radical humanists and pluralists of all shades are implicated in this “grand neglect”. 
One liberal defence is that such theorising is in danger of being overdetermined by 
gender, as is feminist theory in general.  As an essentially contested political-theoretical 
movement, feminism, as Ann Snitow eloquently states, “expresses the paradoxical 
tension between needing to speak and act as women qua woman, and needing an identity 
not overdetermined by our gender”.19 A glaring theoretical divergence is evident here. 
Taking the radical humanist position on the possibilities of overdetermination, 
sympathetic voices may be heard from postmodern feminism. Christine Sylvester, for 
example, has relinquished the pure feminist standpoint position that women’s experience 
can constitute the grounds for a more critical and universal theory of IR, in favour of 
multiple feminist standpoints as a theoretical point of departure.20  
Radical humanism has flexible theoretical borders and has the potential to 
accommodate the feminist standpoint. It is with postmodern feminism, however, where 
radical humanist theorising will attend the theoretical get-together. This entails 
intersubjective discursive conversations between feminist standpoints and liberals and 
radical humanists who are not theoretically “fixed”, but can shift from conceptually 
narrow positions and engage in learning processes of mutual transformation. Feminist 
theorising on the other hand needs a systematic theory of the oligarchic structure of 
international relations.  
Currently, within radical humanist theorising there is much theoretical analysis to be 
done on the gender-specific dimensions of international democratisation and global 
economic restructuring in a radically interdependent post-Cold War world. For feminist 
theorising the ongoing challenge is to engage in meaningful research that brings people’s 
lives and struggles back into the field of IR. This is being achieved in part by forging a 
different relation to global “Western values” through the particularities of identity and 
place. The marginalised are the overriding concern of both feminism and radical 
humanism. This is their shared departure point, as is the emancipatory primacy of moving 
world politics away from the sovereignty of states to the sovereignty of global 
progressive political movements. It is however at this point that radical humanism may 
have to swallow the bitter pill of reality. For world government may follow from such a 




International Relations: how is it for you? 
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Both feminist theorising on IR and writings on the oligarchic structure of 
international relations share a further, exploited position: under representation in 
contemporary IR literature.  Governance, for example, is an academic growth industry 
and offers an important organisational focus for inter-disciplinary work. And yet feminist 
theorising and theories on the oligarchic structure of IR are underrepresented. Take a 
state-of-the-art contemporary work, Debating Governance: authority, steering and 
democracy (2000), edited by Jon Pierre. This collection includes Paul Hirst, who gives a 
magisterial review of the nature, scope and significance of governance. Other theorists 
such as Guy Peters, Rod Rhodes, Gerry Stoker and Andrew Gamble join him. Not a 
single focus on the oligarchic structure of international relations is present; and there is a 
notable absence of feminist theorising. The issue of the state in IR is similarly dominated 
by paradigms that are marked by an absence of emancipatory themes. Naom Chomsky’s 
recent work on US militarism, economic imperialism, and American-led globalisation – 
Rogue states: the rule of force in world affairs (2000) - suffers the same fate; as does 
both John M. Hobson’s contemporary work, The state and International Relations 
(2000), and in the specialised field of international co-operation for democratisation Peter 
Burnel’s (editor) contemporary writing, Democracy Assistance: international co-
operation for democratisation (2001).   
Rather than positing the question to radical humanist theorists that appears in the title 
of this article, “how was it for you?” it is, rather, more pertinent by inverting the tense of 
the question to read: “how is it for you?” The answer, as far as analyses of the oligarchic 
structure of international relations is concerned, is “not so good”. Although analyses of 
the oligarchic structure of international relations are present in sections of idealist 
theoretical posturing, such posturing is nevertheless teeming with a priori idealist world 
government pointers. This liberal, world government ideological standpoint has a 20th 
century pedigree in mainstream publications and is particularly strong in the early 1940s 
and early 1960s. These works include W. B. Curry, The Case for a Federal Union 
(1941), Alan D. Russet, Strengthening of the Framework of Peace (1950), C. H. 
Mangone, The Idea and Practice of World Government (1951), J. A. Borgese, 
Foundations of the World Republic (1952), Frederick L. Shuman, The Commonwealth of 
Man: An Inquiry into Power Politics and World Government (1954), George Liska, 
International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of 
Society (1957), and Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn’s elaborate and sophisticated 
work, World Peace Through World Law (1958, 1960).  
A section of scholars and intellectuals belonging to the Green political movement 
now carry the world government torch, including William Ophuls, Robert Goodwin and 
Robya Eckersley. These Green theorists advocate the creation of a global regulatory 
authority for the efficient and just management of the global ecosystem.21  
Thus, the dearth of literature on the oligarchic structure of international relations runs 
in obvious parallel with the absence of feminist theorising on the oligarchic structure of 
international relations. Even contemporary standard textbooks on feminism, for example 
Jane Freedman’s book, Feminism (2001) omit reference to the oligarchic structure of 
international relations, and yet at the same time call for “non-essentialising and “non-
exclusionary” ways of theorising.22 Feminist inroads into the globalisation debate on the 
other hand have made good progress and need no further comment here, except to say 
that predominantly mainstream male writings on globalisation continue to side step the 
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feminist concerns. This absence, or “abstention” marks out and weakens contemporary 
works on globalisation such as Roger Burbach’s book, Globalisation and Postmodern 
Politics: from Zapatistas to high-tech robber barons (2001), and Justin Rosenberg’s 
analytically pedantic book, The Follies of Globalisation Theory (2001). Marked by their 
absence of feminist theorising/analysis of the oligarchic structure of international 
relations, mainstream contemporary works on aspects of IR continue, therefore, to be 
plagued by theoretical naivety. Publications on Human Rights and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOS) – e.g. Claude E. Welch’s (editor) contemporary study, NGOS and 
Human Rights (2001) – in the main lack a serious feminist focus/international relations as 
a structured oligarchy perspective. Even mainstream studies on environmental security 
are lacking in this theoretical scope – e.g. Jon Barnett’s first, contemporary work, The 
Meaning of Environmental Security: ecological politics and policy in the new security 
era (2001). Contemporary IR discourse, in the final analysis, is in need of feminist 
theorising on the oligarchic structure of international relations. In this theoretical 
endeavour feminist discourse on the condition of women need not shift its emphasis on 
women’s equality; unlike radical humanism which needs to revaluate its subsidiary 
approach to woman’s rights and to (re)postulate feminist standpoints in its endeavour to 
make an alliance with feminism(s). In so doing the answer for radical humanism to the 
question posed above -  “how is it for you” - then becomes one, at the least, of “It’s more 
complex, but theoretically more liberating when in alliance with feminism”. In other 
words, “it’s good for me”. 
 
Theoretical Standpoints 
From one aspect, the emancipatory appeal of radical humanist and feminist discourse 
is centred on the concept of interest. These two ideologies of emancipation speak with 
one voice when it comes to the exploitation of the world’s marginalised people and 
against world politics system lopsided in favour of global corporate interests and the 
developed states (West) in general. The championing of the interests of the dispossessed - 
the ideology of empowerment - unites both theoretical positions at their broadest: a 
“theoretical affinity”. In the context of globalisation, moreover, the suspicion for both 
stances is that texts in the liberal mould remain essentially just that: male/liberal 
theoretical perspectives which indeed offer theoretical complexity, but little in the way of 
progressive feminist/anti-oligarchic substance and clarity.  
Various liberal theoretical schemes have recently gained currency and are even 
presented with a radical alternative appeal, but hardly offer clarity and pragmatism. 
Anthony Giddens’ theoretical schema, for instance, whereby “emancipatory politics” 
(concerned with material values) are separated and from  “life politics”, including the 
demands of feminism and the politics of environmentalism (post-materialist values), 
lacks both theoretical rigour and offers us a “politics of bewilderment”. Identity 
formation, so crucial in feminist theorising, and offered as a supplementary part of 
Giddens’ notion of “life politics”, naively, crudely and inexplicitly excludes economy. 
This is the direct result of Giddens’ theoretical strategy of deploying culture as an 
exclusive category – i.e. in his second tier demarcation of what constitutes life politics. 
We can add to this brief critique the fact that Giddens has postulated the concept of the 
self (“auto-telic-self”) as a shifty restatement of the Kantian principle of the autonomy of 
representations that determine the will. A liberal conception of the self no less, whereby 
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we are informed that “ethics of autonomy” guides the self-directing person capable of 
external agency and internal reformation.23  
Giddens’ liberal and muddied conception of the self can hardly lend itself to the 
plight of the marginalised in the Third World – the overwhelming majority of the global 
population suffering gross economic deprivation. Their interests (built around 
emancipation) are simply not addressed or redressed in a theoretical manner: and they 
are, if Giddens needs reminding, encased, to a significant degree, within the iron cage of 
economy.  
The main point to note here is that Giddens theorising needs feminising and the 
promotion of the economy to a sustainable theoretical position. However, although 
theoretical dialogue is possible with Giddens, the notion of a system of international 
relations based on the promotion of polyarchy as a viable alternative to oligarchic rule 
remains out on a theoretical limb. It does not adequately address the condition of women 
in world politics. 
Promoters of polyarchy define the concept as a system in which a small group 
actually rules, and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice 
carefully managed by competing elites.  For the radical humanist position, and, in short, 
the polyarchic concept of democracy, is an effective arrangement for legitimating and 
sustaining inequalities within and between nations (deepening them in a global economy) 
far more effectively than authoritarian solutions.24  
A Gramscian notion of hegemony is appropriate at this point: one class (or fraction of 
a class) exercises leadership over the other classes by gaining their active consent through 
ideological values. However, applying the concept of hegemony to international relations 
is not to imply the domination of one state, but rather to suggest the domination of world 
politics by the leadership of a transnational dominating elite, an oligarchy that functions 
to sustain a core of powerful states. Thus, the contemporary world system is characterised 
by unequal relations between a core of powerful states and its periphery of much poorer 
states and by a relation of hegemony of one over the other. This Marxist contention of 
power relationships of sits comfortably with radical humanism. This said there is one 
crucial element missing in this analysis of the structure of contemporary international 
relations – i.e. patriarchy.  The global patriarchal order underpins structural inequalities 
and analysis necessitates the deconstruction of the multiple oppressions, including 
gender, sustaining the structural and direct violence of the global political-economic 
system. Radical humanist theorising needs to be alert to this equation in the context of 
reconstructed theoretical practices which display solidarity with feminism. 
Both sets of theorising can form an alliance politically in the face of the increased 
fragmentation of labour and identities, the increased mobility of capital and the 
continuing plight the of world’s marginalised people. Radical humanism needs to note 
from the outset the persistent inequality of women compared with men with reference to 
a global view of the diverse geo-political and economic conditions that have gender-
differentiated causes and consequences.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has analysed the topographical terrain of radical humanist theory and in 
particular its theorising on the oligarchic structure of international relations. It has noted 
that theoretically privileged conceptions of IR lead to theoretical incongruence and 
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divergence between the feminist and radical humanist standpoints. However, 
considerations that take into account the flexibility of radical humanism’s theoretical 
borders, along with the advent of postmodern feminism indicate the potential both for 
theoretical leeway and the construction of a feminist critique of the oligarchic structure of 
world politics. Both emancipatory theories need to negotiate a shared political space. 
They need not “copulate”. Inter-paradigm debate and inter-disciplinary activity is 
required which also take into account Third World liberation and the Green standpoint. 
This will be a most significant and pertinent theoretical process and one that in its 
intentions renders world politics susceptible to humankind collectively.  
An absence of dialogue between radical humanism and feminist IR renders both 
guilty of the charge of theoretical neglect. The promise for both is that such a dialogue 
will generate theoretical complexity, while further illuminating the obstacles to political 
power currently faced by the world’s marginalised. Emancipatory ideologies need to be 
in dialogue with each other and the substance of dialogue between these two 
emancipatory ideologies will inevitably have to revolve around, for example, the 
promotion of woman’s equality, democracy at both the state and international level, 
progressive global movements, especially those emphasising a new global economic 
order, and rationalisation of the existing security and developmental functions of the UN.   
Spike Peterson notes that the IR discipline continues to avoid conversing with 
feminist approaches.25 Within these pages, however, a tentative, broad theoretical 
dialogue has taken place between two sets of theorising. Feminist theorising quite clearly 
is in need of an effective theoretical posture on the oligarchic structure of world politics 
and where it stands with regard to calls for world government. Radical humanism 
however has the greater of the theoretical challenges.  
Paradigms of the oligarchic structure of international relations, including the radical 
humanist standpoint, need to include the condition of women and gender systems as 
significant focus points. They need to render the hidden masculine gender of IR theory 
and practice visible, and demonstrate the difference that theorising on women’s 
inequality makes to the process of understanding world politics. Only then will analyses 
of the oligarchic structure of international relations offer viable theoretical clarity, 
balance and a truly alternative and radical understanding of world politics -- an 
understanding askance of the socialist left and divorced from the liberal position. A 
theoretical understanding that is particular to both feminist and radical humanist 
theorising, and which defies conventional definitions such as a “global third way”.26  
In pragmatic terms, and as noted earlier, both perspectives are supportive of collective 
activism which is intended to create alternative values that motivate broad community 
resistance and empowers people to take control over their everyday lives. Women’s 
regional networking was cited as an essential element in this empowering project. 
Grassroots activism in favour of the democratisation of world politics remains an 
essential pragmatic point. The struggle against global exploitation is ‘personal’, and 
involves us all as individuals and as members of our local communities and indeed the 
global community. One piece-meal way forward is to continue to focus on the strategic 
goal of attaining further intergovernmental documents on universal human rights, 
including the social right to development, education, medical care and employment; 
security against war and environmental disasters. Levels of action or resistance, then, 
take place on the local and international levels.  
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At the grassroots level, small farmers, human rights workers, environment groups, aid 
agencies, trade unionists, minority parties, the landless, networks of fair traders, radical 
intellectuals, spiritual groups, coalitions of anti-globalisers and women’s groups, for 
example, need to coordinate further their protests. These alternative voices can be 
labelled a ‘people’s forum’, or Rainbow politics. However, whichever label we use, 
nothing short of the displacement of the oligarchic structure will suffice if global justice 
is to be achieved. Essentially the UN needs democratising, finally, and participating 
states of the UN outside of the oligarchy need to pool their political resources in calling 
for radical progressive change in the political structure of the UN, rather than hanging 
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